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INCENTIVES VS. NONPARTISANSHIP: THE
PROSECUTORIAL DILEMMA IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM
Legislatures and courts have long had problems defining the ex-
tent to which a prosecutor is permitted to have a personal interest in the
outcome of a case.1 The limits on the personal interest of other public
or quasi-public officers, such as corporate directors, 2 judges,3 county
commissioners, 4 and city mayors,5 are relatively well defined.6 The
limits on the interests of prosecutors, however, defy definition, in large
part because of the prosecutor's unique position in the criminal justice
system. As advocates in an adversary system, prosecutors have a duty
to the state to enhance the effective enforcement of the law.7 But as
officers of the court, federal and state prosecutors are subject to the due
process limitations of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.8 Prosecu-
1. See notes 37-75 infra and accompanying text.
2. See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus.
LAW. 35, 36-43 (1966). Seealso Wardell v. Union Pac. R.R., 103 U.S. 651 (1880); Irving Trust Co.
v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 708 (1935); Globe Woolen Co. v.
Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918).
3. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61
(1928); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
4. See Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 10 N.J. Super. 545, 77 A.2d 255 (1950),
afj'd, 8 N.J. 433, 86 A.2d 201, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952); In re Application of the Bd. of
Supervisors, 154 Misc. 723, 278 N.Y.S. 870 (Sullivan County Ct. 1933); In re Grade Crossing
Comm'rs, 69 Misc. 23, 124 N.Y.S. 1025 (Sup. Ct. 1910), rep'd and report confirmed, 148 A.D. 412,
132 N.Y.S. 960 (1911).
5. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
6. Courts have held, for example, that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty not to par-
ticipate in a corporate decision when their individual interests might be in conflict with those of
the corporation. See, eg., Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
294 U.S. 708 (1935) (corporate directors profited from personal purchases of stock options that the
board had refused to purchase for the corporation). Judges may have no direct pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the cases they hear. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (convictions
overturned because the judge received fees only upon conviction). Similarly, county commission-
ers must be disinterested in condemnation proceedings. See, e.g., In re Application of the Bd. of
Supervisors, 154 Misc. 723, 278 N.Y.S. 870 (Sullivan County Ct. 1933). City mayors may not
serve as judges if they have a significant interest in increasing city revenues. Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928).
7. See notes 97-111 infra and accompanying text.
8. In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935), the Supreme Court stated that "the
action of prosecuting officers on behalf of the state. . . may constitute state action within the
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tors therefore have a duty to criminal defendants to afford them a fair
trial.9 Many courts have stated that as a matter of public policy prose-
cutors must seek justice and not merely convictions.' 0
Permitting a prosecuting attorney to have a personal or financial
interest in obtaining a conviction promotes zealous advocacy, but at the
risk of violating the defendant's due process rights." It is fundamen-
tally unfair, for example, for a prosecutor to be so motivated by per-
sonal interests that he prosecutes vigorously without regard for the
possible innocence of the defendant.' 2 The courts and legislatures have
had little success in balancing the often conflicting interests of encour-
aging the prosecution of crimes and affording criminal defendants due
process. 13
This comment defines the extent to which a public prosecutor may
constitutionally be personally or financially interested in the cases he
prosecutes. After reviewing an important new Supreme Court deci-
sion,14 the comment closely examines the contrasting interests of af-
fording criminal defendants due process through prosecutorial
neutrality and encouraging the prosecution of crimes through the use of
prosecutorial incentives. The comment concludes with proposals
designed to reconcile these competing interests.
I. MARSHALL V JERRICO, INC.: THE DILEMMA OF INCENTIVES VS.
NONPARTISANSHIP
In Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. 15 the Supreme Court inadvertently re-
vealed the dilemmas inherent in a system that guarantees an impartial
trial yet also expects prosecutors to be aggressive. Jerrico, Inc. operated
a restaurant chain in the southeastern United States. An administrator
of the Employment Standards Administration of the Department of
purview of the Fourteenth Amendment." The actions of federal prosecutors are similarly subject
to the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249
(1980).
9. The various guidelines given a prosecutor in deciding to prosecute reflect his duty of
fairness to the accused. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE PROSECTIrON FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSEFUNCTION § 3.9, at 92 (Approved
Draft, 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROJECT].
10. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1962). See also note 69 infra and accompanying
text.
11. See notes 46-61 infra and accompanying text. See Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714
(4th Cir. 1967); State v. Britton, 157 W. Va. 711, 715-16, 203 S.E.2d 462, 466 (1974) ("a prosecu-
tor's duty to the accused is fairness").
12. Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).
13. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980). See notes 103-32 infra and accompa-
nying text.
14. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
15. Id.
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Labor found that Jerrico's restaurants had committed more than 150
violations of the child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.' 6 The administrator assessed substantial fines, which were re-
duced at a hearing before an administrative law judge. Jerrico then
brought suit in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of
the Act's civil penalty provisions.' 7 Those provisions required that the
sums paid to the Treasury as civil penalties for child labor violations be
returned to the Employment Standards Administration as reimburse-
ment for the costs of finding violations and assessing penalties.'8 Jer-
rico claimed that the provisions violated the due process clause of the
fifth amendment because they created an "impermissible risk and ap-
pearance of bias" on the part of the administrator.' 9 The opportunity
for personal or institutional financial gain would, Jerrico argued, en-
courage the administrator to "make unduly numerous and large assess-
ments of civil penalties. ' 20 Jerrico argued that because the assessment
of penalties is a quasi-judicial function, the inducement created by the
civil penalty provisions violated the due process guarantee of neutrality
in the judicial decision-making process.2 '
The Court held that the act of assessing penalties was not quasi-
judicial, but instead closely resembled a prosecutorial function.22
Moreover, the Court observed that an assessed party may obtain review
16. The pertinent child labor provisions are contained primarily in section 12 of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1976).
17. Fair Labor Standards Act § 16(e), 29 U.S.C. § 216(e) (1976).
18. Id.
19. 446 U.S. at 241.
20. Id.
21. Brief for Appellees at 17-19, Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
22. Specifically, the Court stated:
The assistant regional administrator simply cannot be equated with the kind of deci-
sionmakers to which the principles of Tumey and Ward have been held applicable. He
is not a judge. He performs no judicial or quasi-judicial functions. He hears no wit-
nesses and rules on no disputed factual or legal questions. The function of assessing a
violation is akin to that of a prosecutor or civil plaintiff.
446 U.S. at 247. This holding implicitly rejected a century of state and lower court decisions that a
prosecutor performs a quasi-judicial function and is therefore subject to the requirement of com-
plete neutrality. See Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) ("The prosecuting attor-
ney is an officer of the court, holding a quasi judicial position"); State ex rel. Latham v. Spencer
Circuit Court, 244 Ind. 552, 556, 194 N.E.2d 606, 608 (1963); Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Coun-
cil v. Perez, 379 So. 2d 1373, 1376 (La. 1980); Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405, 415-16 (1872); Adams
v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 75, 30 So. 2d 593, 596 (1947); State v. Boyce, 194 Neb. 538, 540, 233 N.W.2d
912, 913 (1975) ("his office is quasi-judicial"); Commonwealth v. Nicely 130 Pa. 261, 270, 18 A.
737, 738 (1889) ("The district attorney is a quasi judicial officer"); Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444,
450, 37 N.W. 244, 247 (1888) (the prosecutor holds "a position analogous to that of the judge who
presides at the trial"). See also ABA PROJECT, supra note 9, § 1.1, at 44. See text accompanying
notes 55-61 infra.
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by an administrative law judge 23 because the reviewing judge can ad-
just or dismiss the penalties, the alleged violator is guaranteed judicial
neutrality in the final assessment of the penalty.24 The Court therefore
held that the mere possibility of bias on the part of the administrator in
assessing the penalties did not violate due process.25
According to the Court, a prosecutor is not a "judicial or quasi-
judicial" officer,26 and therefore is not generally subject to the strict due
process neutrality requirements that the Court applied to judicial of-
ficers in Tumey v. Ohio27 and Ward v. Village of Monroeville.28 The
Court explained:
Our legal system has traditionally accorded wide discretion to crimi-
nal prosecutors in the enforcement process,. . . and similar consid-
erations have been found applicable to administrative prosecutors as
well .... Prosecutors need not be entirely "neutral and de-
tached"...... In an adversary system, they are necessarily permitted
to be zealous in their enforcement of the law. The constitutional in-
terests in accurate finding of facts and application of law, and in pre-
serving a fair and open process for decision, are not to the same
degree implicated if it is the prosecutor, and not the judge, who is
offered an incentive for securing civil penalties. The distinction be-
tween judicial and nonjudicial officers was explicitly made in Tumey,
... where the Court noted that a State legislature "may, and often
ought to, stimulate prosecutions for crime by offering to those who
shall initiate and carry on such prosecutions rewards for thus acting
in the interest of the state and the people. '29
In dictum the Court qualified this strong language, stating that the
prosecutor should serve the public interest, not his private concerns,
and that there are limits to prosecutorial discretion. The Court indi-
cated that enforcement decisions may not be "motivated by improper
factors" or be "otherwise contrary to law."30 Government schemes "in-
23. 446 U.S. at 241, 244; see Administrative Procedure Act § 54, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976); Fair
Labor Standards Act § 16(e), 29 U.S.C. § 216(e) (1976).
24. 446 U.S. at 244.
25. Id. at 246-48.
26. Id. at 248.
27. 273 U.S. 510 (1927). See note 150 infra.
28. 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (a judge should be disqualified if he has an institutional interest in the
outcome of the case).
29. 446 U.S. at 248-49 (citations omitted). See note 111 infra.
30. Id. at 249. The Court cited two cases, Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 n.7, 568-
74 (1975) and Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939), to support this proposi-
tion. In Dunlop the Court adopted the reasoning of the court of appeals, which had stated first
that "the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion should be limited to those civil cases which, like
criminal prosecutions, involve the vindication of societal or governmental interest, rather than the
protection of individual rights." Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 87 (3d Cir. 1974), modied
sub non. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975). Second, the court stated that "clearly de-
fined" factors limited the prosecutorial discretion of the administrator. 502 F.2d at 88. Yet no
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jecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement
process" 31 might bring "irrelevant or impermissible factors into the
prosecutorial decision and in some contexts raise serious constitutional
questions." 32 The Jerrico Court concluded, however, that there was no
need to define precisely the limits on a prosecutor's financial or per-
sonal interest; it found that the reimbursement scheme had little influ-
ence on the administrator.33
The dictum in Jerrico reveals the prosecutor's dilemma in the ad-
versary system. It is difficult to conceive of an incentive plan that offers
a reward to a prosecutor to secure a civil or criminal penalty but does
not inject an impermissible "personal interest, financial or otherwise,
into the enforcement process." 34 Incentive plans are designed to appeal
to personal interests; a prosecutor receiving a conviction fee or a por-
tion of the civil penalty necessarily has a personal financial interest in
the outcome of the case. The following two sections of this comment
explore the conflicting judicial and legislative approaches to reconciling
the competing interests of maintaining impartiality and providing per-
sonal incentives.
factors were clearly defined in Jerrico; moreover, Jerrico involved a criminal prosection. In Roch-
ester Tel Corp. the Court simply held that an enforcement decision based on undisputed facts
cannot be contrary to law. 307 U.S. at 145-46.
Thus, neither of these decisions helps determine the meaning of "improper factors." Other
authorities cited in Jerrico also fail to deal with motives or improper factors. See 446 U.S. at 249
n.ll.
31. 446 U.S. at 249.
32. Id. at 249-50. The Court cited Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978), in
support of this dictum. In Bordenkircher the Supreme Court upheld a conviction even though the
prosecutor, during plea negotiations, had threatened to indict the defendant under a habitual of-
fender statute if he did not plead guilty to the original, less serious charges. The Bordenkircher
opinion also stated that prosecutorial discretion has "constitutional limits upon its exercise," id.,
but did not specify the extent of those limits; it thus provided no guidelines about the meaning of
"irrelevant or impermissible factors."
Jerrico also referred to 28 U.S.C. § 528 (Supp. 111978), which directs the Attorney General to
formulate regulations governing the extent of permissible prosecutorial personal interest. The
Attorney General has not, however, issued any regulations pursuant to the statute. See notes 90-
94 infra and accompanying text. Again, the authority referred to by the Jerrico Court fails to help
define "impermissible factors."
33. 446 U.S. at 250-52. The Court gave three reasons why the interest of the administrator
was too remote to bias him. First, his salary was fixed by law and would not be affected by the
number or amount of penalties he imposed. Second, his employer had no real interest in the sums
collected because the total amount of fines imposed in each past year did not even equal the
amount returned to the Treasury by the Employment Standards Administration in that year.
Third, the agency had allocated the money to the regional offices only once, and did so based on
the expenses incurred in investigating and prosecuting child labor violations, not on the amounts
of penalties collected.
34. 446 U.S. at 249.
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II. SERVING THE PUBLIC INTERESTS: JUSTICE AS THE GOAL OF THE
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
A. The Rationalefor Limiting Prosecutors' Personal Interests.
Although criminal and administrative prosecutors have tradition-
ally been accorded wide discretion,35 enforcement decisions influenced
by improper factors are not immune from judicial scrutiny? 6 Few
courts or legislatures, however, have extensively indicated what factors
influencing the decision to prosecute are improper.3 7 Generally courts
hold that a significant personal interest in the outcome of a case dis-
qualifies a prosecutor from the case,38 but a court's decision to disqual-
ify usually depends on the facts of the particular case. Moreover,
courts and legislatures have in general failed to articulate the precise
legal grounds for disqualifying a prosecutor from a case in which he
has some personal interest. For example, in Berger v. United States39
the Supreme Court relied on both public policy and constitutional
grounds to justify disqualification of the prosecutor. The United States
attorney in Berger had been ruthless and unrelenting in his efforts to
convict the defendant, "overstepp[ing] the bounds of that propriety and
fairness which should characterize the conduct of such an officer in the
prosecution of a criminal offense."' 40 The Court provided no clear stat-
utory or constitutional standard for determining when a prosecutor's
conduct or interests require that he be disqualified. 41 Rather, the Court
merely stated that the "average jury. . . has confidence" that a prose-
cuting attorney will not make "improper suggestions, insinuations,...
[or] assertions of personal knowledge." 42 The Court also stated that
35. Seeid. at 248; Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
182 (1967); Moog Indus. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 414 (1958). See generalo 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE 215-56 (2d ed. 1979).
36. See notes 76-87 infra and accompanying text.
37. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 528 (Supp. I 1978). See
note 63 infra.
38. See notes 76-87 infra and accompanying text.
39. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
40. Id. at 84.
41. The Court merely stated:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a con-
troversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrong-
ful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Id. at 88.
42. Id.
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misconduct by the prosecuting attorney is an "evil influence upon the
jury" and should result in a declaration of mistrial.43
Implicit in the argument that the jury must not be unduly influ-
enced is a concern for protecting a defendant's constitutional right to a
trial "by an impartial jury."44 Although the Court in Berger made no
specific reference to the sixth amendment, the right to an impartial jury
was apparently the ultimate constitutional authority for the holding.
Of course the right to trial by an impartial jury has no application in a
nonjury trial. Nor would this impartial-jury rationale disqualify a
prosecutor on the basis of bias alone. Absent some other grounds for
disqualification, a biased prosecutor in a nonjury trial could therefore
use his influence to intimidate witnesses and to influence the judge im-
properly. And even in jury cases, the prejudiced prosecutor would not
be disqualified until he overtly mishandled the case.45
A second possible constitutional rationale for limiting prosecutors'
personal interests was proposed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Ganger v. Peyfon.4 6 In Ganger the state's attorney prosecuted
the case while representing the accused's wife in a divorce proceeding
based upon the same alleged assault. The court invalidated the convic-
tion on the ground that the prosecutor's dual representation denied the
defendant due process. The court quoted from the Supreme Court's
decision in Mooney v. Holohan:47 "That requirement [of due process],
in safeguarding the liberty of the citizen against deprivation through
the action of the state, embodies the fundamental conceptions of justice
which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions. '48 The
Ganger court also cited Tumey v. Ohio,49 in which the Supreme Court
held that criminal defendants' fifth and fourteenth amendment due
43. Id. at 85.
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI: ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.. ."). Other Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the sixth amendment "impartial jury" guarantee have not referred to the effect of the
prosecutor on the partiality of the jury. They have concentrated instead on the effect of the jurors'
personal backgrounds on the verdict. See Huffman v. Florida, 435 U.S. 1014 (1978) (racial com-
position of the jury); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (sexual composition of the jury);
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950) (employment composition of the jury).
45. Many cases, on the other hand, have held that the bias alone is sufficient to disqualify the
prosecutor. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 255, 561 P.2d 1164, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476
(1977); State ex rel. Latham v. Spencer Circuit Court, 244 Ind. 552, 194 N.E.2d 606 (1963); May v.
Commonwealth, 285 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1955); State v. Melerine, 236 La. 881, 109 So. 2d 454 (1959);
State v. Jones, 306 Mo. 437, 268 S.W. 83 (1924); State v. Boyce, 194 Neb. 538, 233 N.W.2d 912
(1975).
46. 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).
47. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
48. 379 F.2d at 714 (quoting 294 U.S. at 112).
49. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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process rights are violated if judicial and quasi-judicial officials have a
personal interest in the cases they try.50 Equating a prosecuting attor-
ney with a quasi-judicial officer,5' the court of appeals concluded that
the prosecutor's dual representation of the state and the accused's wife
"violates the requirement of fundamental fairness assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. '5 2
The fundamental-fairness rationale for disqualifying prosecutors
would apply to more situations than the impartial-jury rationale would.
First, it would disqualify the vindictive prosecutor from nonjury trials.
Second, it would disqualify a prosecutor when his personal interests
created an appearance of injustice even though they did not affect the
jury. Disqualification in this second situation is important given the
Supreme Court's acknowledgement that "justice must satisfy the ap-
pearance of justice" 53 in order to "generat[e] the feeling, so important
to a popular government, that justice has been done. '5 4
Arguably, the specific holding in the Ganger55 decision is of little
precedential value because Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. 56 specifically stated
that prosecutors do not perform quasi-judicial functions.5 7 This dictum
in Jerrico, however, tends to ignore the Court's language in Imbler v.
Pachtman58 that the discretionary judgment of a prosecutor may be
functionally compared to that of a judge.59 1mbler held that a prosecu-
tor in performing his discretionary duties is entitled to the same abso-
lute immunity as a judge. The constitutional rationale that the Ganger
court employed, however, was not specifically discredited by the Jer-
rico Court. In fact, the Court acknowledged in Jerrico that a
financially-motivated prosecutor could be prompted by his personal in-
terests to act in a manner that would raise "serious constitutional ques-
tions."' 60 Though the prosecutor is not a judicial officer, his conduct
and discretion in enforcement decisions and prosecutions "undoubt-
50. Id. at 523.
5 1. The impact of the contrary treatment of prosecutors in Jerrico is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 55-61 infra.
52. 379 F.2d at 714. See also State v. Britton, 157 W. Va. 711, 715-16, 203 S.E.2d 462, 466
(1974) ("a prosecutor's duty to the accused is fairness").
53. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (a judge was disqualified from presiding at
contempt proceedings concerning an accused who had allegedly reviled him).
54. Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
55. See notes 46-52 supra and accompanying text.
56. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
57. Id. at 247-48.
58. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
59. Id. at 422-23 & n.20.
60. 446 U.S. at 250.
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edly [have] constitutional limits upon [their] exercise."' 6' These limits
could be interpreted as those necessary to preserve the sense of fairness
in the trial process.
A third constitutional rationale for limiting the personal interests
of prosecutors is found in a footnote in Jerrico. In refusing to define
the limits on a prosecutor's personal or financial interest, the Court
noted that "[i]n particular, we need not say whether different considera-
tions might be held to apply if the alleged biasing influence contributed
to prosecutions against particular persons, rather than to a general zeal-
ousness in the enforcement process. '62 This footnote implies that the
rationale for limiting personal interests is to prevent discriminatory and
arbitrary enforcement of the law. In Oyler v. Boles63 the Court em-
ployed similar reasoning, stating that "the conscious exercise of some
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional viola-
tion" as long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classifi-
cation."64
This equal-protection rationale may be as broad in coverage as the
fundamental-fairness rationale. It would justify the reversal of convic-
tions against persons or groups prosecuted vindictively.65 It would also
justify the disqualification of a prosecutor with personal interests in a
case. A prosecutor is likely to conduct a case in which he has a signifi-
cant personal interest differently from a case in which he has no inter-
est. The equal protection clause, however, prohibits the government
from treating citizens differently unless there is a rational relationship
between the differential treatment and a permissible government objec-
tive.66 Serving the prosecutor's personal interests is clearly not a per-
missible government objective.67
61. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
62. 446 U.S. at 250 n.12.
63. 368 U.S. 448 (1961).
64. 368 U.S. at 456, quoted in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
65. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 366-68 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(vindictiveness against a particular defendant can disqualify the prosecutor or invalidate the con-
viction); United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane); United States v. Vel-
sicol Chem. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1255 (D.D.C. 1980).
66. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam);
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). The government objective must, however, be permissible. See, e.g.,
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-56
(1905).
67. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), the Supreme Court referred to the
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public as the only permissible exercises of the
police power.
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A fourth rationale for disqualifying a prosecutor with a personal
interest in a case derives from a common-law approach recognized,
though not relied on, by the Supreme Court in Berger v. United
States.6 8 Under this approach, a prosecuting attorney's conduct may
not, as a matter of public policy, overstep the bounds of propriety.
Courts following this approach have monitored prosecutorial conduct
to ensure that the public interest in promoting justice is served.69 The
Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Marcotte ° summarized the prin-
ciple:
[W]hen the district attorney is personally interested in gaining a con-
viction, his interest is adverse to that of the State, as the State de-
mands no victims, seeking equal and impartial justice only, it being
just as much the duty of the prosecution to see that no innocent man
suffers as it is to see that no guilty one escapes.7'
Courts articulating this rationale have required disqualification both
for prosecutorial bias or vindictiveness and for financial interest in the
outcome of a case.72
The decision to disqualify can best be justified by employing all
four of the preceding rationales. As a matter of public policy, a prose-
cutor, who represents the state, should be expected to serve the public
interest. If his personal interest in the outcome of a case conflicts with
the public's interest in justice, he must be disqualified; if there is a con-
viction, it must be overturned. This conclusion is further justified by
the likelihood that a biased prosecutor will violate a criminal defend-
ant's due process rights. Personal interest by the prosecutor might, for
example, lead to misconduct that could influence a jury and interfere
68. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). See note 41 supra. The Berger Court overturned the conviction
because the prosecutor's improper actions might have poisoned the jury's perspective. 295 U.S. at
85.
69. See State exrel. Latham v. Spencer Circuit Court, 244 Ind. 552, 556, 194 N.E.2d 606, 608
(1963); State v. Cox, 246 La. 748, 763, 167 So. 2d 352, 358 (1964); State v. Osborne, 54 Or. 289,
296, 103 P. 62, 65 (1909); State v. Montgomery, 56 Wash. 443, 445-46, 105 P. 1035, 1036 (1909);
State v. Britton, 157 W. Va. 711, 715-16, 203 S.E.2d 462, 466 (1974). See also People v. Superior
Court, 19 Cal. 3d 255, 266, 561 P.2d 1164, 1172, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476, 484 (1977); ABA CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Nos. 5, 7; ABA PROJECT, supra note 9, § 1.1, at 43-44. Accord, ABA
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 150 (1936).
70. 229 La. 539, 86 So. 2d 186 (1956).
71. Id. at 546, 86 So. 2d at 188. Justice McCaleb, who wrote this statement, was actually
summing up the opinion in State v. Tate, 185 La. 1006, 171 So. 108 (1936). Justice McCaleb
indicated in a footnote that he was not in accord with the Tate decision, 229 La. at 545 n.1., 86 So.
2d at 188 n.1; nevertheless, he followed the Tate decision because the prosecution had not at-
tacked its correctness. Since Marcolte, the decision in Tate has been upheld by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. See Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council v. Perez, 379 So. 2d 1373, 1376-77 (La.
1980); State v. Cox, 246 La. 748, 763, 167 So. 2d 352, 358 (1964).
72. See note 69 supra. The courts have also overturned convictions obtained in violation of
this policy.
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with its role as an impartial fact-finder.73 Similarly, prosecutorial bias
may impugn the general fairness of the trial or result in the singling out
of the defendant for prosecution on arbitrary grounds.74 In any event,
prosecutorial misconduct removes the appearance of justice and fair-
ness required for due process.75
B. The Clear Limits on a Prosecutor's Personal Interests.
1. Case Law. The rationales that courts have employed in limit-
ing a prosecutor's personal interests have established some clear guide-
lines for disqualification. First, a prosecutor is disqualified from
prosecuting a defendant toward whom the prosecutor has feelings of
animosity or hostility.76 This is generally the case when the prosecutor
or a close relative was the victim of the alleged crime.77 For example, a
prosecuting attorney who was in a collision with the defendant may not
prosecute him for driving while under the influence of alcohol.78
Courts have also required disqualification when the prosecutor's dislike
for the defendant leads to unfair treatment of him. 79
Second, recusal or disqualification is mandated if the prosecutor or
a member of his office has a close relationship with the accused.80 A
friendship8' or a counsel-client relationship8 2 may constitute such a re-
73. See notes 39-45 supra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 46-67 supra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 46-54 supra and accompanying text.
76. People v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 255, 561 P.2d 1164, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1977); State
ex rel. Latham v. Spencer Circuit Court, 244 Ind. 552, 194 N.E.2d 606 (1963); May v. Common-
wealth, 285 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1955); State v. Melerine, 236 La. 881, 109 So. 2d 454 (1959); State v.
Jones, 306 Mo. 437, 268 S.W. 83 (1924); State v. Boyce, 194 Neb. 538, 233 N.W.2d 912 (1975).
77. People v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 255, 561 P.2d 1164, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1977) (the
son of a member of the prosecutor's staff was the victim); May v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.2d 160
(Ky. 1955) (the prosecutor was the victim of an assault); State v. Cox, 246 La. 748, 167 So. 2d 352
(1964) (the prosecutor was defamed); State v. Boyce, 194 Neb. 538, 23 N.W.2d 912 (1975); People
v. Krstovich, 72 Misc. 2d 90, 338 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Greene County Ct. 1972). But see Benton v. State,
245 Ala. 625, 18 So. 2d 428 (1944) (the prosecutor was not disqualified even though the murder
victim was his uncle).
78. State v. Jones, 306 Mo. 437, 268 S.W. 83 (1924).
79. See, e.g., State ex rel. Latham v. Spencer Circuit Court, 244 Ind. 552, 194 N.E.2d 606
(1963).
80. See State v. Bell, 84 Idaho 153, 370 P.2d 508 (1962); State ex rel. Williams v. Ellis, 184
Ind. 307, 112 N.E. 98 (1916).
81. See State v. Bell, 84 Idaho 153, 370 P.2d 508 (1962).
82. See, eg., Martin v. United States, 335 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1964); Young v. State, 177 So. 2d
345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); People v. Kester, 33 I11. App. 3d 262, 337 N.E.2d 44 (1975), aft'd, 66
Ill. 2d 162, 361 N.E.2d 569 (1977); State v. Boyd, 560 S.W.2d 296 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); People v.
Clement, 278 A.D. 1040, 106 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1951); People v. Schrager, 74 Misc. 2d 833, 346
N.Y.S.2d 101 (Sup. Ct. 1973). Seegeneralo , ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 6; An-
not., 31 A.L.R.3d 953, 963-78 (1970).
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lationship and can disqualify the prosecutor's entire office.83 Many
courts automatically disqualify the prosecutor if he ever represented
the accused as a private attorney, regardless of what information he
may have learned or feelings he may have developed. 84 A staff mem-
ber's prior representation of the accused may also serve to disqualify
the prosecutor's office.8 5 The existence of information actually ob-
tained and shared by the attorney with the office, rather than the har-
boring of any personal feelings, is generally the factor that determines
whether disqualification is required.8 6 Third, except under exceptional
circumstances, a court will not allow a prosecuting attorney who is a
material witness in the state's case to testify on behalf of the state with-
out withdrawing from the prosecution of the case.87 These three re-
strictions on the possible personal interests of the prosecutor are well
accepted. There is not, however, a consensus among the courts about
whether the prosecutor should be disqualified if he has a direct
financial interest in a case. 88
2. Statutory Law. With the exception of the counsel-client rela-
tionship restriction,8 9 the guidelines for a prosecutor's disqualification
have generally been established through judicial decisions rather than
by legislation. One exception to the general legislative silence in this
area is Congress's enactment in 1978 of section 103 of the Ethics in
Government Act,90 which was intended to codify the principle of
83. State v. Chambers, 86 N.M. 383, 524 P.2d 999 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 372, 524
P.2d 988 (1974). If the entire office is disqualified, a special prosecutor may be appointed to
prosecute the case.
84. See, e.g., People v. Gerold, 265 Ili. 448, 107 N.E. 165 (1914); Perfect v. State, 197 Ind.
401, 141 N.E. 52 (1923); People v. Clement, 278 A.D. 1040, 106 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1951); Thoreson v.
State, 69 Okla. Crim. 128, 100 P.2d 896 (1940); Garrett v. State, 94 Tex. Crim. 556, 252 S.W. 527
(1922).
85. Younger v. Superior Court, 77 Cal. App. 3d 892, 144 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1978); State v. Bums,
322 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. 1959); State v. Chambers, 86 N.M. 383, 524 P.2d 999 (Ct. App.), cer. denied,
86 N.M. 372, 524 P.2d 988 (1974).
86. Gajewski v. United States, 321 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 968 (1964);
State v. Lacquey, 117 Ariz. 231, 571 P.2d 1027 (1977); Cole v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.2d 468
(Ky. 1977); State v. Bell, 346 So. 2d 1090 (La. 1977); Mattress v. State, 564 S.W.2d 678 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1977). See Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 953, 968-73 (1970).
87. See People v. Guerrero, 47 Cal. App. 3d 441, 120 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1975); State v. Dona-
hue, 315 So. 2d 329 (La. 1975) (mem.). But V. People v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. App. 3d 491, 148
Cal. Rptr. 704 (1978) (no general disqualification of the entire district attorney's office where staff
members may be called as witnesses by the defense).
88. See notes 116-32 infra and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 31-2606 (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN..tit. 30, § 506 (1978);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 12, § 30 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 49.158
(1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.08 (West 1968); NEB. REv. STAT. § 23.1206 (1943); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 11-16-05 (1976).
90. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1874 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 528 (Supp. 11 1978)).
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prosecutorial neutrality. The provision directs the Attorney General to
promulgate rules requiring the disqualification of any officer or em-
ployee of the Department of Justice from participation in a case "if
such participation may result in a personal, financial, or political con-
ffict of interest, or the appearance thereof."9' The legislative history of
the section shows an intent to require the Attorney General to broaden
the regulations prohibiting financial conflicts of interest to include pro-
hibition of personal and political conflicts of interest.92 Congress be-
lieved that any conflict of interest on the part of the prosecutor would
reflect adversely on the "integrity of the entire judicial system" if the
prosecutor were allowed to handle the case.93 The Attorney General
has not yet promulgated any rules in the new areas. The regulations on
the financial interests of a federal attorney, however, are clear: if the
prosecutor's performance of his duty "has or appears to have a direct
and predictable effect upon a financial interest" of his or of a relative,
he should be disqualified from handling the matter.94 This regulation
relates only to Justice Department attorneys and not to attorneys repre-
senting administrative agencies; moreover, only financial interests are
prohibited.
There are relatively few state statutes in this area. Most states
have a statute disqualifying a prosecutor who had any type of a coun-
sel-client relationship with the defendant in a previous or pending civil
matter;95 many states also prohibit the public prosecutor from receiving
a fee other than his salary from any individual or from the state itself.96
91. 28 U.S.C. § 528 (Supp. 11 1978).
92. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1977), reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4217, 4295.
93. Id. 62, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4278.
94. Justice Dep't Standards of Conduct, 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-5 (1979). In the late 1880s the
federal government enforced statutes that were designed to reward the prosecutor for convictions
and therefore had a "direct and predictable effect" on his financial interests. Section 824 of the
1878 Revised Statutes of the United States rewarded the prosecutor a maximum of thirty dollars
for each conviction. See Act to Regulate Fees and Costs, ch. 80, § 1, 10 Stat. 161 (1853). Section
825 gave the prosecutor two per cent of all tax revenues he collected. See Act to Prevent and
Punish Frauds, ch. 76, § 11, 12 Stat. 741 (1863). See generaly United States v. Matthew, 173 U.S.
381, 386 (1898). In 1896, however, Congress enacted a law requiring all such fees to go into the
Treasury, and in 1905 Congress prohibited United States district attorneys from receiving any
more fees beyond their regular salaries (except in the District of Columbia). See Appropriations
Act of May 28, 1896, ch. 252, § 6, 29 Stat. 140, 179 (1896); Appropriations Act of March 3, 1905,
ch. 1483, § 1, 33 Stat. 1156, 1207 (1905).
95. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 31-2606 (1963); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 506 (1978);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 12, § 30 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 49.158
(1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.08 (West 1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 23.1206 (1977); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 11-16-05 (Supp. 1979).
96. See statutes cited in note 95 supra. See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-9-10 (1977); S.C. CODE
§ 1-7-360 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.49 (West Supp. 1980).
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Beyond this, state statutes place no specific limitations on a prosecutor's
personal interests.
III. CONTRAST: THE INCENTIVES OR REWARDS CONCEPT
A. The Desirabiiiy of Prosecutorial Rewards.
A number of decisions have recognized the desirability of offering
incentives to prosecutors to encourage zeal and vigor in the enforce-
ment process. 97 It is generally presumed, in light of the competitiveness
of the adversary system,98 that government lawyers will have some in-
terest in winning their cases. 99 The Supreme Court thus noted in Mar-
shall v. Jerrico, Inc. 100 that government prosecutors are "necessarily
permitted to be zealous in their enforcement of the law";' 0 ' in fact, they
"ought to" be rewarded for initiating and carrying on prosecutions in
the public interest. 102
The Supreme Court has approved certain specific incentives in-
tended to encourage zeal in protecting the public interest. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Murphy'0 3 the Court approved a law that
required a portion of a criminal penalty to be returned to the informer.
The Court concluded that such reimbursement did not necessarily de-
prive the informer of his competence as a witness."14 In Dorsheimer v.
United States 0 5 the Court specifically approved a reward system for
federal tax collectors. One half of the financial penalty imposed upon a
person convicted of evading federal taxes was returned to the revenue
agent who discovered the fraud. The Court found that such rewards to
public officers would "stimulate and reward their zeal and industry in
97. See, eg., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1980). See notes 103-11 infra
and accompanying text.
98. The adversary nature of the system is guaranteed by the requirement that the parties to a
case have personal stakes in its outcome, thus creating a "case or controversy." See Frothingham
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1927); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). A conflicting
interest is necessary so that a court's perspective is not distorted by uninterested parties that fail to
argue the issues vigorously. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
221 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). Even though prosecutors represent the public
interest, it is therefore at least arguably desirable that they have some type of personal stake in the
outcome of their cases. See generally United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2; ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-23.
99. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1980); Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 75-79,
30 So. 2d 593, 596-97 (1947); State v. Osborne, 54 Or. 289, 296, 103 P. 62, 65 (1909).
100. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
101. Id. at 248.
102. Id.
103. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203 (1842).
104. Id. at 209-10.
105. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 166 (1868).
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detecting fraudulent attempts to evade the payment of duties and
taxes."10 6 Thirty years later the Court reaffirmed the value of such in-
centives in United States v. Matthews, 0 7 in which a deputy marshal was
rewarded for his participation in the arrest and conviction of a crimi-
nal. The Court wrote favorably of the "expediency of offering to public
officers a reward as an incentive or stimulus for the energetic perform-
ance of public duty." 10 8 The Court was careful, however, to distinguish
between rewards from private individuals and rewards from the gov-
ernment, stating that a public officer could receive only a reward au-
thorized by "competent legislative and executive authority."' 1 9 These
three cases were decided in the 1800s, however, when many federal
employees received their compensation largely from the fees or fines
they collected rather than through the current salary system.110 In Jer-
rico the Court in dictum specifically approved incentive systems for
salaried public prosecutors, stating that the adversary system assumed
the propriety of prosecutorial incentives."'
The concept of incentives has led many states to enact laws that
reward prosecutors based on their "effectiveness," which is usually de-
fined in terms of number of convictions. In eight states the prosecutor
receives conviction or prosecuting fees as additional compensation.
The fees are either collected from the defendant as a portion of the
financial penalty and then given to the prosecutor or paid to the prose-
cutor directly by the local government. 112 The fees are graduated, with
106. Id. at 173.
107. 173 U.S. 381 (1899).
108. Id. at 386.
109. Id. at 385.
110. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5332 (Supp. 11 1978). See also note 94 supra.
111. 446 U.S. at 248-49. See text accompanying note 29 supra. In so holding, the Court
quoted from Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927), that states "ought to" offer incentives for
those initiating public prosecutions. As authority, Tumey had cited to United States v. Murphy,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203 (1842), which had held only that informers, not public prosecutors, should
receive rewards. Because most public prosecutors are now salaried, this oversight is particularly
significant. See note 94 supra.
112. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-1707 (1979) (the prosecutor receives $5 for each judgment, $10 for
each misdemeanor conviction, and $25 for each gambling conviction); DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 8701
(1974) (Attorney General receives $10 for prosecuting capital crimes, and 5% on collecting for-
feited bonds); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 351.18 (West 1968) (repealed, effective Oct. 1, 1982) (the state
attorney receives a reasonable fee for judgments against the railroad in railroad safety cases); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 53, § 8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) (the prosecutor receives $30 for serious convic-
tions, $15 for lesser convictions, and $25 for each day employed in the trial of a case); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 16:4 (West 1963) (the state pays $5 to $25 for convictions); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16
§§ 11442-11446 (Purdon 1956 & Supp. 1980); Tnx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 1023-1025
(Vernon) (1979); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 3883, 3890 (Vernon 1966) (the county or district
attorney receives $250 for an antitrust conviction and varying amounts for other convictions based
on the county and on the seriousness of the conviction); Wvo. STAT. § 18-3-303 (1977) (fees to be
set by county commissioners).
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larger fees paid for more serious crimes. In one state prosecutors also
receive commissions on the criminal or civil penalties assessed. 1 3 Nine
states have laws imposing on the convicted defendant prosecuting fees
that go into the state or county coffers."i 4 Thirty-four states have no
prosecuting or conviction fees, though in a number of these, laws pro-
viding for such fees were only recently repealed."I5
B. Court Decisions About the Award of Financial Incentives to
Prosecutors.
The award of fees or commissions, because they are generally
small, may not significantly affect the motivation of a prosecutor. 16 In
Bonnet v. State,1 7 however, a New Jersey superior court found that
conviction fees in general violate public policy. The court stated that
compensating prosecutors for obtaining convictions is inconsistent with
the prosecutor's duty "not to convict but to see that justice is done.' 18
113. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 53, § 8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980).
114. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1707, 24-116 (1979) (felony conviction fees go to the county);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2905(c) (Supp. 1980); IND. CODE. ANN. § 33-14-7-20 (Burns Supp. 1979);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 340.9 (West 1977) (fees go to court expense fund); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-3-
9(l) (Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 56.310, 56.330 (Vernon Supp. 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22A:3-2, 2A:158-13 (West 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-21-301, 8-22-201 (1980); W. VA.
CODE §§ 59-1-28, 59-2-17 (1966).
115. Many states expressly or impliedly forbid the awarding of conviction fees and commis-
sions. See ARiz. CONST. art. 22, § 17; ALASKA STAT. § 39.27.011 (1970); IDAHO CODE § 31-2606
(1963); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 30, § 506 (1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 12, § 30 (Michie/Law. Co-op
1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 49.158 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.08 (West 1968); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 23-1206 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 36-1-7 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-16-05
(1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 101, tit. 19, § 215.27 (West 1976 & Supp. 1978); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 8.790, 8.030 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-9-10 (1977); S.C. CODE § 1-7-360 (1976); S.D.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 7-16-23 (Supp. 1980) (except in child support cases, no fee allowed); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 17-16-19 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 1183 (Supp. 1980); VA. CODE §§ 14.1-54, -
121 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.49 (West Supp. 1980). Alabama, California, Kansas, Kentucky,
North Carolina, and Oklahoma have repealed the statutes imposing prosecuting or conviction
fees. See 1975 Ala. Acts 2500 (repealing ALA. CODE tit. 11, § 85 (1958)); 1947 Cal. Stats. 1039
(repealing Ch. 21, 1851 Cal. Stats. 187); 1974 Kan. Sess. Laws 576 (repealing KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-224 (1973)); 1980 Ky. Acts. 596, 730 (repealing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69.550 (Baldwin
1979)); 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 200 (repealing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-12 (1970)); 1969 Okla. Sess.
Laws 254 (amending OKLA. STAT. tit. 28, § 101 (Supp. 1968)). Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Washington have never
legislated in this area.
116. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-1707 (1979) ($5 to $25 goes to the prosecutor); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 53, § 8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) ($15 to $30); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16:4 (West 1963)
($5 to $25); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-21-301 (1980) ($5 to $50). But see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 56.310
(Vernon Supp. 1980) (up to $150 for conviction and 25% on sums collected); Tax. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. ANN. art. 1023 (Vernon 1979) ($250 for an antitrust conviction).
117. 141 N.J. Super. 177, 357 A.2d 772 (1976).
118. Id. at 242, 357 A.2d at 809 (citations omitted). See also State v. Detroit Motors, 62 N.J.
Super. 386, 391-92, 163 A.2d 227, 230-31 (1960).
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Besides articulating this public policy rationale, the court noted that if
the fees were regularly increased to reflect inflation they might become
high enough to pose constitutional problems. 1 9 The Bonnet court did
not identify the specific constitutional problems that might arise from
the award of prosecution fees. Rather, the court cited three decisions 20
that had merely held that due process requires judicial neutrality.
None of the cited cases involved prosecutorial partisanship.
Only two other courts have specifically addressed whether convic-
tion fees should be permitted under the Constitution or as a matter of
public policy. In Wyatt v. Statel2 a Texas court upheld in a three-
paragraph opinion a state statute providing for prosecution fees. Ac-
cording to the court, a prosecutor did not perform a judicial function
and the fees therefore did not violate the Texas Constitution. 22 The
court did not discuss the federal due process implications of
prosecutorial partiality or the public policy arguments against such
partiality. 23
In People v. Peters 2 4 an Illinois appellate court addressed the due
process question and held that "the imposition of [conviction] fees is
clearly constitutional."'' 2 5 The defendant in Peters did not, however,
argue that prosecutorial partiality had violated his due process rights
by affecting the fairness of his trial.'2 6 Instead, he asserted that the fee
arrangement, which provided for the assessment of higher prosecution
fees against defendants who were convicted after pleading not guilty,
denied him due process because it had a chilling effect on his decision
to plead not guilty.127 He also argued that the fee arrangement denied
defendants equal protection of the laws by discriminating against the
poor.' 28 The court rejected both arguments, finding that the possibility
of a $15 fee being imposed after a conviction was not "chilling" and
that the defendant, who was not poor, lacked standing to allege this
violation of equal protection. 29 Because the defendant in Peters failed
119. 141 N.J. Super. at 241, 357 A.2d at 808-09. The fees ranged from five to fifteen dollars.
120. The three decisions the court cited were Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57
(1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); and State v. Chinn, 146 W. Va. 610, 121 S.E.2d 610
(1961).
121. 112 Tex. Crim. 280, 16 S.W.2d 231 (1929).
122. Id. at 281, 16 S.W.2d at 232. The relevant provision of the Texas Constitution, TEx.
CONST. art. 5, § 11, deals exclusively with the disqualification of judges.
123. See notes 46-61, 68-75 supra and accompanying text.
124. 32 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 337 N.E.2d 73 (1975).
125. Id. at 1020, 337 N.E.2d at 75.
126. See notes 46-54 supra and accompanying text.
127. 32 Ill. App. 3d at 1020, 337 N.E.2d at 75.
128. Id.
129. Id., 337 N.E.2d at 75-76.
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to make a number of due process and policy arguments 130 against the
imposition of prosecution fees, the Peters decision provides only lim-
ited support for the validity of financial incentive arrangements.
Reward systems providing for conviction fees and commissions on
fines could constitute the type of scheme that, according to the Supreme
Court in Marshall v. errico, Inc. ,'31 would inject "personal interest
... into the enforcement process" and thereby bring "irrelevant or im-
permissible factors into the prosecutorial decision and in some contexts
raise serious constitutional questions."132 Although financial incentives
are intended to provide rewards for prosecutors who ably perform their
duties, they also encourage law enforcement for reasons unrelated to
those that are supposed to shape decisions. The difficult problem is to
reconcile the desire to encourage effective prosecution with the danger
that financial incentives may compromise the fairness of trials.
IV. PROPOSED GUIDELINES OR RESOLUTIONS
Ensuring impartiality and providing prosecutorial incentives are
conflicting goals in our adversary system. Although courts have almost
uniformly held that a prosecutor may not have a personal nonfinancial
interest in a case, 33 courts have not agreed about the propriety of per-
mitting a prosecutor to have a direct financial interest in the outcome of
a case.' 34 Some courts have found that financial incentives can be im-
proper modes of motivation and therefore are unconstitutional or
against public policy. 35 The three proposals that follow attempt to rec-
oncile the advantages of prosecutorial incentives with their constitu-
tional and public policy problems.
A. Eliminate the Possibiliy of Personal Interest.
The simplest approach to the dilemma might be to consider a pros-
ecutor a quasi-judicial officer, as suggested in Ganger v. Peyton. 136 Al-
though there is language in Jerrico to the contrary, 37 this language was
not essential to the holding of the case and in fact contradicts a century
of state and lower court holdings. 138 Thus this proposal would extend
130. Four possible rationales for disqualification are discussed in notes 39-75 supra and ac-
companying text.
131. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
132. Id. at 249-50.
133. See notes 76-87 supra and accompanying text.
134. See notes 97-132 supra and accompanying text.
135. See notes 116-20, 131-32 supra and accompanying text.
136. 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967). See notes 22, 46-61 supra and accompanying text.
137. 446 U.S. at 247.
138. See note 22 supra.
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the requirement of absolute neutrality that is imposed on judges to all
public and administrative prosecutors.139 Although this approach,
which "solves" the dilemma by removing the possibility of incentives,
has serious drawbacks, 140 there are good reasons to consider it further.
This approach would require states to repeal all statutes that pro-
vide outcome-based incentives to prosecutors. 14' Prosecutors thus
would receive no compensation or fees beyond their set salaries, re-
gardless of the pleas entered by defendants or the complexity of the
trial. Furthermore, Congress would, if it followed this approach,
amend section 103 of the Ethics in Government Act 42 to prohibit any
prosecuting attorney, state, 43 federal, or administrative, from partici-
pating in a case in which he is personally or financially interested. By
redefining "personally" under the Act to include such factors as feel-
ings of animosity, prior or current attorney-client relationships, or wit-
nessing the crime, 44 and by redefining "financially" to include any
additional compensation or fee received for prosecuting or handling a
case, Congress could effectively preclude any prosecutorial incentive
arrangements.
The reasons for this approach are persuasive. Numerous lower
court cases have specifically held a prosecutor to be a quasi-judicial
officer. 145 If the impartiality approach of these cases were the law, the
prosecutor's duty of serving justice would be unobstructed by his per-
sonal interests. Moreover, the constitutional guarantees of an impartial
jury, due process, and equal protection would be ensured 146 because
both the public prosecutor and the judge would operate to protect de-
fendants' rights.
Applying a standard of impartiality to prosecutors is sound be-
cause a significant aspect of a prosecutor's function is quasi-judicial: 147
a prosecuting attorney must constantly decide when and when not to
139. Under this proposal, state and federal courts would apply to prosecutors the standard of
neutrality described in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 5 10 (1927), and Ward v. Village of Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57 (1972). See note 150 infra.
140. See text accompanying notes 160-61 infra.
141. See notes 112-14 supra.
142. 28 U.S.C. § 528 (Supp. 1 1978). See notes 90-94 supra and accompanying text.
143. Given the due process and equal protection arguments supporting prosecutorial neutral-
ity, see text accompanying notes 46-67 supra, Congress would have sufficient power under the fifth
clause of the fourteenth amendment to impose restrictions on state governments. See note 8 supra
and accompanying text.
144. See notes 76-87 supra and accompanying text.
145. See note 22 supra. See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976).
146. See notes 39-67 supra and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 & n.20, 431 n.33 (1976). See also
notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
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enforce the law. One survey of United States attorneys revealed, for
example, that fewer than one-fourth of the complaints they received
resulted in the filing of formal charges. 48 In Jerrico the Supreme
Court acknowledged that "the decision to enforce or not to enforce
may itself result in significant burdens on a defendant. . . , even if he
is ultimately vindicated in an adjudication."' 49 Such discretion in de-
ciding whether and how to prosecute should arguably subject the pros-
ecutor to the same neutrality standards to which judges are subject. 150
Indeed, the same standards of conduct are already applied to judges
and prosecutors in several situations. For example, the Supreme Court
has disqualified judges who have held defendants in contempt from
adjudicating the contempt proceedings.' 51 Similarly, state courts have
forbidden prosecutors from prosecuting defendants who assaulted
them. 52 Both judges153 and prosecutors 54 have been disqualified be-
148. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges.- A Quantitative Study of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 251-52 (1980).
149. 446 U.S. at 249. See generally 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 215-56. Moreover, adminis-
trative prosecutors may actually assess a binding penalty on alleged viblators, a function that is
similar to a judge's duty to determine the amount of a penalty. This comparison, however, was
rejected by the Jerrico Court. See 446 U.S. at 245-49.
150. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976) (absolute immunity for prose-
cutors based partially on the similarity of their functions to those of a judge). For example, in
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), the Supreme Court reversed convictions rendered by a
mayor whose salary was paid in part by the fees and costs that he levied while acting in a judicial
capacity. According to the Court, a procedure of compensation would be impermissible if it
"might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the state and the accused."
Id. at 532. A prosecutor who decides whether or not to bring a particular defendant to trial
should be subject to a similar requirement. See generally Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245
(1977) (per curiam); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Chase v. City of Evans-
ton, 172 111. 403, 50 N.E. 241 (1898); 2 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.03 (lst ed.
1958). But cf. Depauw Univ. v. Brunk, 53 F.2d 647, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1931), a don other grounds,
285 U.S. 527 (1932) (administrative tribunals need not be disinterested and impartial).
151. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455
(1971); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954). But see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
In Tumey the Court stated that "matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of
interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion." Id. at 523. This
indicates that there is no constitutional prohibition on the influence of such factors on the judge.
This conclusion seems contrary to the holdings in the Taylor, Mayberry, and Offutt decisions, in
which the "personal bias" of the judge was considered a matter of constitutional (due process)
importance. Judicial animosity alone, however, does not disqualify a judge unless it stems "from
an extrajudicial source." United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). See generally
28 U.S.C. § 144 (1976). For example, a defendant may not claim bias or prejudice merely because
the judge ruled against him. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31 (1921).
152. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
153. See W. Clay Enterprises v. Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp., 467 F. Supp. 801
(D.P.R. 1979) (disqualifying a judge who had acted as labor counsel for the defendent). See 28
U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (1976) (federal judges with prior attorney-client relationships with the accused
are to be disqualified).
154. See note 82 supra.
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cause of previous or existing attorney-client relationships with a party.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has implied that a prosecutor, like a
judge, may not be influenced in his public decisions by the possibility
of institutional gain.155 Finally, the Court has indicated that, as with a
judge, direct pecuniary interest in a case can disqualify a prosecutor.156
Boards of commissioners are another quasi-judicial group whose
functions are similar to those of some prosecutors and whose standards
of conduct may therefore reasonably be applied in the law enforcement
context. Boards of commissioners are not judges but, like prosecutors,
are expected to serve the public interest. 7 Commissioners may pre-
side over condemnation or valuation proceedings, a function analogous
to the penalty assessment function of the administrator in Jerrico.158
The personal-interest standard applied to commissioners is generally
one of strict neutrality. One New York court asserted that
"[u]nquestionably, an interest in the [condemnation] award, however
slight or remote, would disqualify the commissioner and be fatal to the
award .... -159 Given the similarities in the functions of commission-
ers and prosecutors, the latter arguably should also be held to a stan-
155. InJerrico the Court decided that the personal interest of the prosecutor was too remote to
constitute a violation of due process because, among other reasons, the presence of any institu-
tional gain that the prosecutor may have felt when he helped increase the agency's funds was
nominal at best. 446 U.S. at 250; cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (a judge
must be disqualified if he has reason to feel a sense of institutional gain when he increases govern-
ment revenues); Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928) (because the mayor-judge had only a remote
relationship to the finances of the city, the conviction was valid).
156. The Jerrico Court observed that the prosecutor's salary was fixed, regardless of his per-
formance. 446 U.S. at 250. A direct pecuniary interest might have disqualified the prosecutor.
Cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (a judge was disqualified because of direct pecuniary
interest).
157. Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 10 N.J. Super. 545, 567, 77 A.2d 255, 265
(1950), afj'd, 8 N.J. 433, 86 A.2d 201, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
158. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242-48 (1980).
159. In re Grade Crossing Comm'rs, 69 Misc. 23, 25, 124 N.Y.S. 1025, 1028 (Sup. Ct. 1910),
rev'd and report confirmed, 148 A.D. 412, 132 N.Y.S. 960 (1911). Some courts have allowed the
commissioners to have slight personal interests in the outcome of the condemnation hearings. See
Chesapeake & 0. Canal Co. v. Binney, 5 F. Cas. 561 (C.C.D.C. 1830) (No. 2,645); In re Dillman,
263 Mich. 542, 248 N.W. 894 (1933) (no disqualification because a party has given an officer a
dahlia bulb); In re Application of the Bd. of Supervisors, 154 Misc. 723, 278 N.Y.S. 870 (Sullivan
County Ct. 1933) (disqualification was not required, though the officer owned a newspaper that
occasionally published notices for the condemning county); People ex rel. Howlett v. Mayor of
Syracuse, 63 N.Y. 291 (1875). See also Note, The Disqualfication of Administrative Officials, 41
COLUM. L. REv. 1384 (1941). A fairly frequent case of remoteness of interest occurs when a board
member has no personal interest in the matter in controversy but may arguably be interested for
some technical reason. Thus, interest as a trustee in the corporation whose property is being
condemned has been held not to disqualify. See People ex rel. Howlett v. Mayor of Syracuse, 63
N.Y. 291 (1875). Neither did a commissioner's interest as a nominal shareholder in a party corpo-
ration disqualify him from condemnation proceedings in Chesapeake & 0. Canal Co. v. Binney, 5
F. Cas. 561 (C.C.D.C. 1830) (No. 2,645).
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dard of strict neutrality in the cases they handle. This approach would
produce a consistent standard for all public officers who represent the
public interest and seek justice at a hearing or trial.
There are, however, two problems with requiring prosecutorial
neutrality. First, complete impartiality would be very difficult to
achieve. Personal pride and public pressure to win at trial are likely to
bias a prosecutor regardless of any neutrality requirement.160 A second
and more serious problem is the failure of this approach to provide
incentives that encourage enforcement. The prosecutor would receive
no reward for pursuing complex cases or for vigorously prosecuting
cases brought to trial. Considerations of pride and reputation, of
course, can sometimes sufficiently motivate a prosecutor; but more tan-
gible incentives are often necessary. The neutrality approach ignores
the compelling need' 61 for encouraging vigorous and effective prosecu-
tions.
B. Eliminate the Goal of Justice.
A second solution to the dilemma of conflicting goals would be to
discard the notion that the prosecutor strives for justice and to recog-
nize that in a true adversary system the opposing parties should have
adversary interests.' 62 The prosecutor, according to this solution,
should be permitted not only to have personal reasons for winning the
case, but also to have significant financial reasons for representing the
public. Thus, Congress and state legislatures could properly enact laws
making prosecutors' salaries contingent, in whole or in part, on ob-
taining convictions. The fee for a particular case could be determined
by the seriousness of the crime 63 and could be paid either by the de-
fendant or, if he is unable to pay, by the government.
This approach would undoubtedly motivate prosecutors, and it
would likely increase the efficiency of prosecutorial resource allocation:
few prosecutors would be likely to spend time on cases that were un-
likely to end in conviction. But there are disadvantages to this second
proposal that significantly outweigh its positive points. First, even
though he is a public officer, the prosecutor would have no reason to
serve the public interest, rather than his own, if the two clashed. The
prosecutor would be a "hired gun," undeserving of the public's trust.164
160. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 75-79, 30 So. 2d 593, 596-97 (1947).
161. See notes 97-111 supra and accompanying text.
162. This was basically the approach of the court in Wyatt v. State, 112 Tex. Crim. 280, 16
S.W.2d 231 (1929). See notes 121-22 supra and accompanying text.
163. See note 112 supra for examples of such fee arrangements.
164. See notes 68-72 supra and accompanying text.
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Second, a prosecutor performs some discretionary functions that
are unreviewable; 165 he is therefore immune from civil liability for the
negligent performance of these duties.' 66 Pretrial decisions are particu-
larly adjudicatory in nature. 167 An incentive system based solely on
convictions would severely distort and bias the prosecutor's perspective
toward conviction and thus require drastic fundamental changes in the
reviewability of his pretrial decisions to preserve some sense of impar-
tial justice in the pretrial stage.
Finally, the constitutional considerations of an impartial jury, of
due process and fundamental fairness, and of equal protection would
present serious obstacles to the actual implementation of a pure incen-
tive system in the trial stage. 68 The Supreme Court has specifically
acknowledged the serious constitutional problems inherent in an un-
trammeled incentive program 69 and has indicated that the prosecutor's
duty to seek justice rather than win cases is of constitutional magni-
tude. 70
C. Equating Personal Interest with the Public Interest.
The preceding two proposals illustrate the problems in completely
eliminating either incentives or neutrality in attempting to resolve the
problem of the apparently confficting goals of the prosecutorial system.
Both goals-zealous prosecution, and fairness and impartiality-are
designed to serve distinct purposes. To reconcile the two goals and
serve the purposes of each, the rewards offered the prosecutor should
motivate him to serve the public interest in justice and to guarantee the
constitutional requirements of an impartial jury, due process, and
equal protection. Under this approach, a prosecutor would receive per-
sonal gain not by obtaining convictions but by ensuring that justice is
done both to the accused and to society.
Any such approach must, however, resolve certain threshold
problems. First, it may be difficult to devise a tangible yardstick to
165. See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
166. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-30 (1976).
167. Such decisions include, for example, whether and when to prosecute, whether and what
to plea bargain, whether to present a case to the grand jury, whether to file an information,
whether to dismiss an indictment against particular defendants, what penalty to seek, and even
whether to offer to put the accused in a drug rehabilitation program or to compensate the victim in
return for a dismissal of charges. These resemble judicial functions. See notes 58-59, 147-50supra
and accompanying text.
168. See notes 39-67 supra and accompanying text.
169. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1980); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
170. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107-14 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963). See also note 9 supra.
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measure the prosecutor's success in achieving the intangible goal ofjus-
tice. One possible yardstick of success is the number of convictions
obtained by the prosecutor, a standard some states currently employ. 171
In the interest of justice, however, prosecutors should be rewarded only
for just convictions. 172 In addition, the prosecutor should be rewarded
for other meritorious prosecutorial decisions and efforts in plea bar-
gaining, grand jury hearings, deciding what charges to bring, accumu-
lating evidence, and deciding whether to prosecute. The tangible
standards should thus provide for evaluation of the prosecutor's per-
formance in terms of his success in achieving fairness in all facets of his
job.173
A second problem that arises under this proposal is deciding who
should judge the prosecutor's success at achieving justice. One possi-
bility is to let the public decide in yearly elections. The prosecutor's
actions would consistently be in the public eye because of the fre-
quency of the elections; and the public, in whose interest the prosecutor
acts, presumably is the best judge of its own interests. There are obvi-
ous problems, however, with this approach. The public typically
knows little about the actual guilt or innocence of defendants, and lay-
men are rarely familiar with trial records or the propriety of trial tac-
tics. Moreover, awareness of the public's vindictiveness toward a
particular defendant could influence the prosecutor to prosecute ruth-
lessly for a conviction, not for justice.
The party charged with judging prosecutorial success must be both
knowledgeable about the prosecutor's job and impartial about the facts
of each case. He must be able to view the prosecutor's performance
from the prosecutor's perspective, so that the prosecutor's tactics and
efforts can be accurately evaluated. Moreover, the reviewing party
must be in a position of confidentiality with respect to the various cases
handled by the prosecutor. Classified information, prosecutorial strat-
egy (such as having a potential defendant turn informant), and infor-
mation given to grand juries could not be made known to outside
attorneys or third parties without risking the destruction of long-term
prosecutorial plans.
171. See notes 112-14 supra and accompanying text.
172. Rewarding prosecutors only for just convictions, however, would be difficult because all
convictions not overturned on appeal are arguably just. An incentive system must, therefore,
focus on the process of prosecution and not on the result.
173. Because so few cases are brought to trial, the prosecutor should be encouraged to do
justice at all stages of his enforcement work. See notes 148-50 supra and accompanying text. On
the other hand, review of all the prosecutor's actions may be logistically impossible.
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The evaluating party should not be a judge, however, because of
the separation-of-powers conflict that occurs when one branch of gov-
ernment has continous control over the compensation received by
members of another branch. The Constitution recognizes a somewhat
analogous separation-of-powers issue; Congress may not increase or di-
minish a President's salary while he is in office, 17 4 a prohibition in-
tended to prevent undue congressional influence on executive
decisions. Similarly, judges should not have such influence over the
salaries of the executive branch members who practice before them.
The preferred approach would reconcile the competing goals of
the prosecutorial system while recognizing the need for a tangible and
viable index of a prosecutor's success and the need for performance
evaluation by a disinterested party trained in the law. Under this pro-
posal, Congress and the state legislatures would permit prosecutors to
have only certain personal interests in their cases. This would ensure
that personal interests such as feelings of hostility, personal relation-
ships, and counsel-client relationships would be barred. Such legisla-
tion would help maintain the appearance of justice while eliminating
personal motives that might distort the prosecutor's perspective. More-
over, Congress and the state legislatures could provide for compensa-
tion above the normal salary to prosecuting attorneys who perform a
superior job in seeking justice and fairness. The United States Depart-
ment of Justice Principles of Federal Prosecution,17 5 which sets stan-
dards for all aspects of prosecutorial discretion "with a view to
providing guidance rather than to mandating results,"176 would be use-
ful for evaluating prosecutorial performance. Under these guidelines a
prosecutor is not expected to gain convictions; he is supposed to exer-
cise his discretion in a manner consistent with justice.177 Congress and
the state legislatures could require the prosecutor's superior officers to
review periodically the prosecutor's actions and evaluate them under
the Department of Justice standards.' 7 8 Based on the outcome of this
174. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (judges' salaries may not be dimin-
ished during their tenure in office).
175. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, 27 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA)
3277-92 (1980).
176. Id. 3277.
177. Moreover, the general principles enunciated by the Supreme Court could be used in any
areas left unclear by the Principles of Federal Prosecution. The prosecutor would, for example, be
expected to prosecute vigorously if evidence indicated guilt, to "strike hard blows. . . [not] foul
ones." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). It would be "as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one." Id. See note 41 supra.
178. This approach is somewhat similar to the Oregon compensation statute. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 8.830 (1979). This section reads:
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review, the superior officers would award up to a stipulated sum in
addition to the prosecutor's regular salary. The attorney general could
also be empowered to issue additional guidelines to clarify the prosecu-
tor's duty.
This proposal would best reconcile the personal interests of the
prosecutor with the goal of justice. Because of the possibility of addi-
tional compensation and the requirement of periodic review, the prose-
cutor would be motivated to ensure that justice is done and to avoid
acting in an improper or careless manner. The prosecutor would feel
obligated to protect the constitutional interests of defendants as well as
the interest of the public in justice; at the same time the prosecutor
would be offered incentives to ensure his zeal and superior job per-
formance.
V. CONCLUSION
Providing incentives to a prosecutor without injecting impermissi-
ble personal factors into the law enforcement process presents serious
constitutional and public policy questions. Improper modes of motiva-
tion may not only offend the concept of the public prosecutor's duty,
but may also violate the basic notions of fairness and justice that un-
derlie the constitutional guarantees of an impartial jury, due process,
and equal protection. 79 An incentive system must therefore reward
the prosecutor not merely for convictions, but for just, fair, and vigor-
ous enforcement in all areas of his performance. o80 This comment has
attempted to reconcile these conflicting goals by suggesting that prose-
cutors be given incentives by their superiors charged with periodically
evaluating their performance.
Some ramifications of such a system may militate against its adop-
tion. First, the state and federal governments may be unwilling to allo-
cate the revenue needed to offer prosecutors additional compensation.
Increased government spending is especially unpopular today, as is in-
Additional compensation from county for district attorney and deputies paid by state.
Whenever, in the judgment of any county court or board of county commissioners, the
salaries paid by the state to the district attorney, or to any deputy district attorney, are
not commensurate with the character of the service performed, the county court or board
of county commissioners may pay out of the funds of the county such additional
amounts as will properly compensate said officers for the service performed.
The use of the county court or the board of commissioners as the judging party may not be desira-
ble, however, because of: (1) a possible separation-of-powers conflict if the trial judge had the
power to award the prosecutor additional compensation; and (2) the likely lack of expertise in trial
tactics and matters of law among county commissioners. See note 174 supra and accompanying
text.
179. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). See notes 39-75 supra and accompa-
nying text.
180. See notes 148, 167 supra and accompanying text.
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creased government regulation. Second, finding and maintaining rela-
tively disinterested superiors may be difficult, especially given the
realization that reviewing officers may be hesitant to evaluate harshly a
prosecutor with whom they have recurring professional contact. Third,
the placement of discretionary compensation authority in the hands of
prosecutors' superiors may only magnify the problem if the personal
interests and prejudices of the superior enter into his compensation de-
cision.' 8' Fourth, the mere possibility of a loss of job or reputation
may be sufficient to motivate prosecutors to just and fair enforcement.
The incentive program arguably would do little to increase zeal or fair-
ness, and in any event any gains in these areas would be difficult to
measure.
Nonetheless, the possibility of additional compensation would al-
most certainly attract more competent and highly motivated attorneys
to the public prosecutor system, resulting in more vigorous and compe-
tent enforcement of the law. Government officials have long lamented
the difficulty of keeping good attorneys in the public sector; because
insufficient compensation lies at the heart of this problem,182 an incen-
tive system offers at least a partial solution. Rewarding prosecutors for
vigorous and fair enforcement of the law would be a step toward im-
proving the system of criminal justice.
Dirk G. Christensen
181. Given the hierarchical structure of current prosecutorial offices, however, the ultimate
power to allocate additional compensation rests in the hands of an elected official whose salary is
fixed and who is responsible to the electorate for his discretionary decisions.
182. See, eg., N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, § 2, at 3, col. 6.
Vol. 1981:311]
